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1 Introduction
A near-canonical claim among observers of highly-divided societies is that the degree to which dis-
agreements or cleavages are “crosscutting” constitutes a critical stabilizing feature of those political
systems. When adversaries on one dimension are allies on another, political polarization and dis-
affection are reduced and stability enhanced, other things being equal. By contrast, when enmity
persists across dimensions, disaffection and instability are likely to follow.
Two mechanisms are hypothesized to underlie this relationship. The first is sociological: by
creating sympathies for differing arguments and opinions (Coser 1956; Dahrendorf 1959; Lipset
1960; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and improving communication across divisions (Deutsch ????),
crosscutting cleavages improve the likelihood of conciliation. Lipset writes,
Where a man belongs to a variety of groups that all predispose him toward the same
political choice, he is ... much less likely to be tolerant of other opinions. The available
evidence suggests that the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that
groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations.
To the degree that a significant proportion of the population is pulled among conflicting
forces, its members have an interest in reducing the intensity of political conflict (1960,
88-89).
The second mechanism, which is the primary focus of our analysis in this paper, is political:
crosscutting cleavages prevent the emergence of permanently excluded groups (Truman 1951; Dahl
1971; Przeworski 1991) by creating the potential for power sharing. The nature of this power-
sharing is determined by the constitutional structure of the polity: for example, power-sharing may
be contemporaneous (if different societal groups are given veto or agenda control in specific policy
domains) or it may be inter-temporal (if a group excluded today has the opportunity to influence
policy tomorrow).
The claim that crosscutting cleavages have beneficial political consequences may, however, be
subject to a number of challenges (e.g., Dahl 1966; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Lijphart 1977).
First, a majority coalition of factions may indefinitely exclude a minority from the policy making
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process even in the presence of crosscutting cleavages. Second, issue dimensions over which cleavages
are crosscutting may differ in their degree of salience (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972), further limiting
the influence of a minority faction if it is only permitted to participate in policy making on irrelevant
issues. And third, permanent losers may endure their status as such if the outside option they would
exercise by engaging in extra-constitutional politics is sufficiently costly.
The theoretical literature following the initial, largely positive statements about of the salutary
effects of crosscutting cleavages suggest that the relative salience or importance of issues may
moderate those effects. In their 1972 book, Rabushka and Shepsle argue that a necessary condition
for those effects is that the second dimension of conflict be politically salient: for example, if the
norms of a society dictate that disagreement with respect to that dimension be adjudicated in
the private sphere, then the fact that it crosscuts the primary dimension of political conflict is
immaterial. By contrast, Dahl (1966) argues that “unifying effects cannot occur if all the cleavages
are felt with equal intensity. Conciliation is encouraged by crosscutting cleavages only if some
cleavages are less significant than others” (368). Below, we explicitly incorporate issue salience into
our models; this permits us to adjudicate between these two competing claims.
To date, none of the above arguments has been subject to formal theoretical analysis, which is
the principal aim of the current inquiry.1 The model we introduce below explicitly considers both
the effect of crosscuttingness on the political disaffection of outgroups in a society, as well as the
mediating effects of issue salience. Moreover, by explicitly modeling how issue salience can affect
factions’ political attachments, our model does not fall prey to the critique, made by Chandra and
Boulet (2005), that classic theories of permanent exclusion are based on “primordialist” assumptions
that group attachments are permanent and fixed.
In light of these objections, several questions emerge. First, what preference profiles give rise
to crosscutting cleavages? And second, does crosscutting reduce the potential for political conflict?
If so, under what conditions? In this paper, we take a step toward answering these questions by
articulating a very simple model of political conflict under different decision making structures. Our
1Critically, while the groundbreaking analysis of Rae and Taylor (1970) introduces measures of crosscuttingness,
the authors simply articulate the hope (p. 112) that those measures will ultimately be employed in future theories
of democratic stability.
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aim is to examine the extent to which, and the conditions under which, received wisdom regarding
crosscutting cleavages does and does not hold.
In our model, three groups or “factions” compete to set policy in a two-dimensional space;
these factions can coalesce by making binding agreements with one another to make policy at the
centroid of their ideal points. We define several intuitive measures of crosscuttingness, each of
which quantifies the extent to which adversaries on one dimension might be allies on another. We
then consider policy making and political conflict under two alternative governance structures: in
the first, policy making on the two dimensions is bundled : a single coalition sets policy on both
dimensions. Because governing coalitions will invariably exclude one faction, the relevant possible
effect of crosscutting cleavages in the distribution of factions’ preferences is through their effects on
the probability of realignments producing changes in the composition of the governing coalition.
Thus, the bundled governance structure is one in which power-sharing, if it occurs, is inter-temporal.
Under the second governance structure, policy making on the two dimensions is unbundled : the
coalition that forms to make policy on one dimension may differ from the coalition that forms on the
other dimension. In the unbundled governance structure, crosscutting cleavages are instantiated in
dimension-specific coalitions, thus giving the opportunity for all three factions to participate in the
creation of policy. Hence, unbundled governance corresponds to contemporaneous power-sharing.
Our model of unbundled policy-making underscores a close association between the changes
in crosscutting cleavages and political realignments. According to the “classic” account of the
dynamics of realignment (cf., Poole and Rosenthal 2006), a new issue gains in prominence relative to
an old one, producing a reshuffling of electoral coalitions such that former allies become adversaries
and vice versa.2 While, holding fixed the preference profile, crosscutting cleavages are a necessary
(though not sufficient) condition for realignment, realignments brought about by changes in relative
issue salience are instances of changes in relative crosscuttingness of the underlying profiles of
individual preferences. In this sense, the analysis of the consequences of susceptibility to political
realignments provides a particularly potent test of the traditional intuitions about the salutary
effects of crosscuttingness.
2Earlier influential works on realignment in U.S. politics include Key 1966; Burnham 1975; Sundquist 1983.
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Our results suggest that the effects of crosscutting cleavages on political welfare of societies
are far more subtle than previously documented. In the bundled policy model, changes in the
preference profile that increase the degree to which cleavages are crosscutting can either increase
or decrease the disaffection of the excluded faction, even holding constant the average extent of
disagreement between factions – unless that extent of latent disagreement is sufficiently small
to begin with. While changes in the relative salience of the policy issues can make a political
system more susceptible to realignment, we show that the effects of such changes on disaffection
are ambiguous: they sometimes increase and sometimes decrease disaffection.
In the unbundled policy model, the dimension-specific coalitions that form in equilibrium are
unaffected by the relative salience of the issues. As in the bundled policy-making model, changes in
the preference profile that increase crosscuttingness can either increase or decrease the disaffection
of the faction most unhappy with the equilibrium policy.
Unbundling the policy-making is, in effect, a way of institutionalizing crosscutting cleavages,
and our final set of results considers the consequences of doing so. We find that, consistent with
some of the prior scholarship, unbundling can decrease the disaffection of the most dissatisfied
faction. But we also show that under certain conditions, it can have the opposite effect, and,
moreover, the cost of unbundling may be the selection of Pareto inefficient policies – something
that can never happen in the bundled policy making environment.
In what follows, we first review the theory of crosscutting cleavages in plural societies and
describe the concept informally. Then, we articulate common primitives for both models and our
measures of disagreement and disaffection. We then describe the bundled policy making model, the
unbundled policy making model, and comparisons between the two. Finally, we relate our findings
to three well-known historical examples of political conflict in multiple dimensions.
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2 Are Crosscutting Cleavages Salutary?
2.1 Some Motivating Examples
Whigs and Tories in Great Britain, 1688-1742. According to Stasavage (2003), the existence
of crosscutting cleavages in parliament enhanced Great Britains ability to credibly commit to a
moderate policy – namely, the maintenance of a land tax to service public debt – that permitted
the country to borrow at low interest rates and fight wars in the first half of the 18th century.
In particular, British politics during the period was characterized by conflict over taxation and
finance between landed and financial or “moneyed” interests (the latter of whom contained most
government creditors), and conflict over other issues, most prominently religious toleration. A
diversity of opinion within the landed class over religious toleration made cleavages crosscutting:
religiously tolerant landed elites were closer to government creditors on religious issues, and closer to
the less-than-tolerant landed elites on economic ones. The Whig coalition in parliament, Stasavage
argues, was sustained by a series of compromises between anti-conformist landed and moneyed
interests over religious toleration, monarchical succession, and the land tax (122).
The Second Party System in the United States and its Collapse, 1828-1854. The
period of American history commencing with the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 and concluding
with the collapse of the Whigs and the emergence of the Republican party in the mid-1850s can
be described as one characterized by waxing and waning crosscutting cleavages. At the beginning
of the period, the national policy agenda was dominated by economic issues: most prominently,
protectionism and the continued existence of a national bank. The emergence of abolitionism in
the 1830s made slavery an increasingly prominent issue on the national agenda. While abolitionist
sentiment was largely rejected by both the Northern and Southern wings of the Democratic party,
the Whig party contained pro- and anti-slavery contingencies (Sundquist 1983). Southern Whigs
could coalesce with Democrats on the slavery issue, as they did to impose a series of gag rules
preventing consideration of abolitionist petitions in the House of Representatives (Holmes 1988).
The relative calm of this partisan alignment could not survive the increasing prominence of the
slavery issue, which by the 33rd Congress (1853-1854) had displaced disagreement on economic
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Figure 1: The Canonical Intuition: Crosscuttingness Reduces Polarization
M = 0 R = 1 M = 0 R = 1
I = 1 B,C C ′ B
D = 0 A A
issues as the primary dimension of US politics (Poole and Rosenthal 2006, ch. 5). As the Whig
coalition collapsed and the unequivocally abolitionist Republican party displaced it, cleavages no
longer crosscut. The Civil War would begin seven years later.
2.2 A Heuristic Model
Why might we observe the emergence of crosscutting cleavages sometimes enhance, and sometimes
undermine, political stability? To begin to answer this question, imagine a society characterized
by two binary cleavages or divisions, which we will refer to as middle (M) versus right (R), and
intermediate (I) versus down (D). These divisions could be economic, ethnic, religious, or cultural.
The society is composed of three equally-sized factions, A, B, and C. In one version of the society,
faction A occupies the MD position, and both B and C occupy the RI position. In the second
version, factions A and B are unchanged, but faction C (relabeled C ′) now occupies the MI position.
Figure 1 displays these two variants graphically.
Rae and Taylor (1970) define “crosscuttingness” as the proportion of all pairs of individuals
whose two members are in the same group on one cleavage but in different groups on the other
cleavage. In the first version of the society, crosscuttingness is zero. In the second, crosscuttingness
is 2/3: of the three pairs (AB, AC ′, and BC ′), two (AC ′ and BC ′) are allies on one cleavage and
adversaries on the other. (The remaining pair, AB, are adversaries on both.)
The widely accepted view, which, henceforth, we refer to as ”the canonical intuition,” is that
societies with crosscutting cleavages experience less polarization and greater stability. The expressly
political rationale for it (as distinct from the sociological one noted in the Introduction) is that
crosscutting cleavages enhance the likelihood that “out” factions can forge governing coalitions,
thus increasing their stake in the current regime. By contrast, when a faction’s outsider status is
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a permanent feature of the polity, it raises the incentives for that faction to engage in obstruction
and/or extraconstitutional means to achieve its political ends (Przeworski 1991). This rationale is
closely associated with pluralist political thought (e.g., Truman 1951; Dahl 1956). Dahl (1971, 115),
for example, argues that political conflict is more likely to be moderate when “no ethnic, religious,
or regional subculture is ‘indefinitely’ denied the opportunity to participate in the government.”
By adding some fairly straightforward assumptions, we can capture the canonical intuition. In
particular, suppose (a) the four cells in the 2×2 matrices above correspond to ideal policy positions
on the unit square in the xy-plane, with MD = (0, 0), RD = (1, 0), MI = (0, 1), and RI = (1, 1);
(b) the utility to a faction of a particular policy is decreasing in the linear distance between its
ideal point and the policy; and (c) the two closest factions can form a minimum winning coalition
and set policy at the centroid of their ideal points. Other things being equal, the stability of the
polity is reduced to the extent that the excluded faction finds the implemented policy intolerably
far from its own preferred policy.
In the first version of the society, B and C coalesce and set policy at the RI position (1,1), to
the exclusion of faction A, which must suffer the loss associated with a policy
√
2 away from its
ideal. In the second version of the society, either B and C ′ or A and C ′ coalesce. If the former, B
and C ′ set policy at (12 , 1), and the excluded faction A suffers a smaller loss, as policy is now only√
1.25 away from it. If A and C ′ set policy at (0, 12), B suffers an equivalent loss.
While the intuition conveyed by the above examples may seem straightforward, we next show
that it relies on an implicit, yet clearly implausible, assumption: namely, that disagreement on
either dimension is “all or nothing.” To see the effect of relaxing this assumption, consider the next
example, which provides a variation on the 2x2 example above. Suppose that divisions between
factions are no longer binary, but may differ by degree. In addition to the M and R positions, a
faction can also occupy a left (L) position on the horizontal cleavage, which we will assume is at -2
on the horizontal axis; likewise, in addition to the I and D positions, a faction can occupy either an
elevated (E) or up (U) position. We will assume the elevated position is at 2 on the vertical axis,
and that up is at 4. In the first version of this society, A and B continue to occupy MD and RI as
before, but C occupies LE. In the second, A and B are unchanged but C (relabeled C ′) occupies
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Figure 2: Introducing “Distance” Makes the Effect of Crosscuttingness on Polarization Ambiguous
L = −2 M = 0 R = 1 L = −2 M = 0 R = 1 L = −2 M = 0 R = 1
U = 4 C ′′
E = 2 C
I = 1 B C ′ B B
D = 0 A A A
LI. In the third, C (relabeled C ′′) occupies the MU . These three preference configurations are
depicted in Figure 2.
In all three configurations, given the assumptions described above, A and B coalesce to set
policy at (12 ,
1
2), and C is the outlier faction. In the first configuration, depicted in the left panel,
no pair of factions share a common position on either dimension, but clearly, A and B are more
closely aligned on the horizontal dimension than either is to C; and on the vertical dimension, A
and C are further from each other than either is to B. Because of the absence of commonality,
crosscuttingness, per the Rae and Taylor measure, is zero. The loss suffered by C = (−2, 2) from
the equilibrium policy is equal to
√
8.5. A change from C to C ′′ = (−2, 1) (as depicted in the center
panel) increases crosscuttingness to 1/3, while decreasing the outlier faction’s loss to
√
6.5. Thus,
based on this comparison, the canonical intuition appears to hold. But consider a change from the
first configuration to the third (depicted in the right panel). A change in the outlier faction from C
to C ′′ = (0, 4) increases crosscuttingness from zero to 1/3. Now, however, it increases the outlier
faction’s loss, from
√
8.5 to
√
12.5.
Why does the comparison of the left and middle panels reproduce the canonical intuition,
whereas the comparison of the left and right panels does not? Clearly, the answer is related to
distance: in the shift from the left to the right variations, the upward shift from C to C ′′, which
does not contribute to the increase in crosscuttingness, swamps the rightward shift, which does.
This is the case even though the horizontal and vertical shifts are, in distance terms, the same.
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3 A Model of Crosscutting Cleavages
3.1 Basic Primitives
Three equally-sized factions, labeled A, B, and C, compete to set policy in a two-dimensional
policy space, with the dimensions labeled x and y. The three factions’ ideal points are given by
A = (xA, yA), B = (xB, yB), and C = (xC , yC). We normalize the locations of A and B to A = (0, 0)
and B = (1, 1), and permit C to be any point in R2. We assume throughout that all factions share
the functional form of the utility function, which is a version of the standard Euclidean measure
of the distance between two points but explicitly weighted by the relative “importance” of the
corresponding dimensions. In particular, let ω ∈ [0, 1] be the salience parameter, which describes
the weight of the second, y-dimension relative to the x-dimension; the x-dimension is given the
corresponding weight of 1 − ω. Given two factions I and J , the ω-weighted Euclidean distance
between them, DωIJ , is given by
DωIJ = [(1− ω)(xI − xJ)2 + ω(yI − yJ)2]
1
2 .
A faction’s utility, then, is simply a decreasing, linear function of the ω-weighted Euclidean distance
between its ideal point and the implemented policy vector. Given these assumptions, the conjunc-
tion of the location of C’s ideal point and the salience parameter ω offers a complete description
of the preference profile in the polity.
A political system is characterized by the two elements: (1) a preference set (ρ, u(·, ω)), which is
given by a pair of a profile ρ of factions’ ideal points and the corresponding vector of utility functions
u(·, ω), which reflects the underlying value of the salience parameter ω; and (2) an institutional
framework I, which determines the rules governing coalition formation among the three factions
and how policy is made. Because the functional form of utility function is common and held fixed,
we will suppress the dependence on it in what follows, except for its corresponding value of ω. As
a shorthand, we will refer to a generic political system as (ρ, ω, I).
We will consider two institutional environments for policy-making. The first, which we will
refer to as the bundled policy-making environment, is an environment in which a single governing
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coalition consisting of a majority of factions sets policy on both policy dimensions simultaneously.
We abstract away from details of intra-coalitional bargaining and assume, instead, that the policy
is set at the centroid of its participating factions’ coordinates, leaving as the salient choice for the
factions which other factions to coalesce with in anticipation of policy selection.
For factions I, J , and K, we will speak of the coalition IJ as corresponding to the situation
where factions I and J form a governing coalition, and likewise of a coalition IJK in the case of a
grand coalition consisting of all the factions.
Apart from the bundled policy-making environment, we also consider another commonly dis-
cussed institutional setting, in which institutional policy is made separately on each policy dimen-
sion. We will refer to it as the unbundled policy-making environment. In that environment, we will,
likewise, speak of a x-coalition IJx as the governing coalition of I and J formed with respect to the
policy-making on dimension x, and similarly for y-coalitions for the policy-making on dimension y.
3.2 Measures of Crosscuttingness
We now move to defining precisely the notion of “crosscutting cleavages” for a two-dimensional
polity. (Extension to an arbitrary n-dimensional polity is cumbersome but obvious.) First, call the
profile of ideal points projected onto a given dimension z, ρz, the “cleavage” on that dimension.
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According to this terminology, the “cleavage structure” of the polity is simply the profile of two-
dimensional ideal points, ρ. Our measures of crosscutting cleavages capture fundamental differences
between ρx and ρy.
The first of these measures is binary:
Definition 1 (Binary Crosscuttingness). A profile of ideal points ρ is binary crosscutting if the
subset of factions that generates the two closest points in ρx differs from the subset of factions that
generates the two closest points in ρy.
For example, suppose, as assumed above, that A = (0, 0), B = (1, 1), and that, further, C =
(34 ,−12). Then cleavages are crosscutting: B and C are the closest factions on the x-dimension,
3Generally, and in this model in particular, we assume that cleavages are “non-zero,” by which we mean that the
factions’ ideal points do not collapse to the same point on that dimension.
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Figure 3: Crosscutting Cleavages as a Function of the Location of Faction C
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Darker shading indicates greater crosscuttingness under the corresponding measure.
whereas, A and C are the closest on the y-dimension. If, instead, C = (34 ,
3
4), then B and C are the
closest factions on both dimensions, and cleavages are not crosscutting. The left panel in Figure 3
displays locations of C for which cleavages may be said to be binary crosscutting in our model.
Informally, if cleavages are binary crosscutting, no faction finds itself an “outlier” on both
dimensions. For convenience, below we use below a (binary) index, denoted Qb ∈ {0, 1}, to indicate
whether the cleavages are binary crosscutting, with Qb(ρ) = 0 indicating that ρ is not binary
crosscutting, and Qb(ρ) = 1 indicating that ρ is.
Our second measure of crosscuttingness generalizes this intuition, giving rise to finer variations
in the extent of crosscuttingness. To define it, construct binary rankings of distances between
ideal point projections onto dimension x, and separately, between projections onto dimension y.
Denote by (IJ)x the distance between the projections on x of arbitrary points I and J . Given ideal
points I, J,K, and L, and dimensions x, y we will say that (IJ,KL) ranking is reversed across issue
dimensions x, y if and only if (IJ)x, is smaller (larger) than (KL)x but (KL)y is smaller (larger)
than (IJ)y. We, then, have the following definitions:
Definition 2 (Rank Crosscuttingness). A profile ρ’s rank crosscuttingness index Qr(ρ) is the
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total number of rankings reversed across issue dimensions for the points in ρ. A profile of ideal
points ρ has higher rank crosscuttingness than the profile ρ′ if and only if Qr(ρ) > Qr(ρ′).
To take the two above examples, if C = (34 ,−12), then (BC)x < (AC)x < (AB)x, and (AC)y <
(AB)y < (BC)y. (BC,AC) and (BC,AB) are reversed across issue dimension, while (AC,AB)
is not; therefore Qr = 2. If, by contrast, C = (34 ,
3
4), then there are no reversals across issue
dimensions and Qr = 0. Note that in our model Qr(ρ) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The right panel in Figure 3
displays areas of C that give rise to different Qr values, given the fixed positions of A and B.
The comparison of that panel to the one illustrating binary crosscuttingness suggests clear sim-
ilarities. These are not coincidental: binary crosscuttingness is also an index that counts ranking
reversals across issue dimensions, but it is concerned with a possibility of a single reversal, in ef-
fect, asking whether there is at least one reversal across issue dimensions for the rankings that
include shortest distances between ideal point projections. For example, there are no such rever-
sals in the white square around point B in the binary crosscuttingness panel, but for locations of
C in that square, there exist rankings reversed across issues dimensions that do not change the
ideal points that give rise to the shortest distances between corresponding projections - in partic-
ular, the (BC,AC) is reversed in the lightest-gray rectangles nested in that square in the rank
crosscuttingness panel.
STATE THAT THESE MEASURES ARE SPATIAL GENERALIZATIONS OF TAYLOR RAE
– B/C XC=0 EXCEPT IN KNIFE’S EDGE CASES.
3.3 Measures of Disagreement and Estrangement
Next, we introduce a measure of the potential for political conflict brought about by the extent of
disagreement within a polity (given the relative salience of the issue dimensions), independent of
the polity’s political institutions.
Definition 3. The mean latent disagreement (MLD) in a political system, denoted D
ω
, is the
average ω-weighted Euclidean distance between the ideal points of all pairs of factions.
For example, suppose ω = 0.25 and C = (3, 2). Then given our assumptions about the locations
of A and B, MLD would be D
.25
= 13(D
.25
AB +D
.25
AC +D
.25
BC) ≈ 1.86. The level curves for mean latent
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Figure 4: Level curves of Mean Latent Disagreement for different values of C and Axis of Symmetry
at ω = 0.25
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disagreement given ω = 0.25 are depicted in Figure 4. Also depicted in the figure is the axis of
symmetry, defined as the set of points for which C is equidistant from A and B (DωAC = D
ω
BC).
Holding ω fixed, for any value of C above the axis of symmetry there exists a value C ′, below that
induces an equivalent profile of ideal points (ignoring labels) up to a rotation about the axis.
Mean latent disagreement provides a spatial generalization of the familiar ethnolinguistic frac-
tionalization (ELF) index from comparative politics. ELF may be interpreted as the probability
that any two randomly drawn individuals belong to different ethnolinguistic categories. A common
observation regarding ELF is that it does not incorporate information about the extent of policy
disagreement among those categories. For example, if A, B, and C were ethnic groups, ELF in our
model would be equal to 1/3 irrespective of their locations in the policy space or the salience of the
policy dimensions. By contrast, mean latent disagreement does take this information into account.
As the name implies, however, D
ω
is a measure of latent, rather than actual, conflict. The next
measure captures the maximal estrangement of the various factions from the equilibrium policies
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produced by the political system, and consequently, the potential for realized conflict in the political
system. As will become clear below, this measure depends both on the underlying policy-making
institutions as well as on the preference profile of the citizens.
Definition 4. Maximal Estrangement in a political system, Π(ω, ρ; I) is the largest ω-weighted
Euclidean distance between a faction’s ideal point and the equilibrium policy vector.
If political stability is a measure of political welfare of societies, and actions that affect that
stability are a function of agents’ (dis-)satisfaction with the policy status quo chosen under a given
set of political institutions, then maximal estrangement must be a key relevant statistic of political
welfare. Higher maximal estrangement means that the agents who are least satisfied with the
outcome of the political system (i.e., agents with highest estrangement) may be more enticed to
actions that subvert it. We suppress the microfounded model that would generate this type of
result.
3.4 The Bundled Policy-Making Model
3.4.1 Equilibrium
We begin with a characterization of the equilibrium of the bundled policy making game, and
then move to the analysis of the effects of crosscutting cleavages under the corresponding bundled
policy-making institutions.
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium coalitions and outcomes:
Proposition 1. In the unique Nash equilibrium of the bundled policy-making model, the governing
coalitions and policy vector (x, y) are, respectively:
(1) AB and (12 ,
1
2) if and only if D
ω
AB ≤ DωAC and DωAB ≤ DωBC ;
(2) AC and (xC2 ,
yC
2 ) if and only if D
ω
AC ≤ DωAB and DωAC ≤ DωBC ;
(3) BC and (1+xC2 ,
1+yC
2 ) if and only if D
ω
BC ≤ DωAB and DωBC ≤ DωAC .
In equilibrium, the two closest factions will form a coalition and set policy at the midpoint of the
line segment connecting their ideal points. The equilibrium coalition that sets policy is minimum
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Governing Coalitions for Three Different Values of ω
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winning because in a “grand” coalition of all three factions, two of the three factions could always
be made better off by excluding the third.
It is noteworthy that the equilibrium coalition that forms will depend not only on the locations
of the three factions, but also on the relative salience of the two dimensions, as summarized by the
parameter ω. This dependence is encapsulated in the following remark:
Remark 1. (1) In the bundled policy-making environment, the equilibrium governing coalition
depends on the relative salience of the two policy dimensions. (2) For a fixed set of ideal points,
different values of the relative salience of the two policy dimensions can give rise to one, two, or
three distinct governing coalitions under conditions displayed in the left panel of Figure 6.
Figure 5 displays the first part of the remark graphically. First, consider the middle panel,
which corresponds to the situation in which the policy dimensions are equally weighted. The gray
region corresponds to locations of faction C in which B and C will form a coalition against A;
likewise, the striped region contains locations of C that yield coalitions of A and C against B.
Finally, the white area corresponds to situations in which C is sufficiently far from A and B that
A and B will form a coalition against C.
Note, however, that the sets of preference profiles giving rise to these coalitions vary as a
function of ω. In the left panel of Figure 5, the x-dimension is significantly more salient than
the y-dimension. This results in a vertical stretch of the AC and BC regions. In the limit, as ω
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Figure 6: Coalitions at Intermediate Levels of Relative Salience May Differ from Coalitions That
Would Form on the x- and y-Dimensions.
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In the left panel, white regions correspond to values of C for which the same governing coalition
will form irrespective of the value of ω; gray regions to values for which two governing coalitions
are possible depending on ω, and striped regions to values for which three are possible. The right
panel gives an example of the third category, in which C = (−13 , 53).
approaches zero (from the right), the corresponding ellipses converge to vertical bands – the value
of xC is all that matters, while yC is irrelevant. Likewise, the right panel of the figure corresponds
to a situation in which the y-dimension is significantly more salient than the x. Here, the stretch
is horizontal; as ω approaches one, the ellipses would converge to horizontal bands.
The second part of the remark is depicted graphically in the left panel of Figure 6. The white
regions in the figure correspond to locations of C in which only one coalition is possible irrespective
of the value of ω. For example, if C is within the same white region as A, A and C will coalesce
against B no matter what the relative salience of the two policy dimensions. Note that these regions
correspond to areas of C-space in which cleavages are not binary crosscutting, as described above
and in Figure 3.
The solid gray regions in the figure correspond to locations in which two coalitions are possible.
In these situations, for low values of ω the equilibrium coalition profile is the same as that which
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would form were politics restricted to the x-dimension, whereas for high values of ω the coalition
profile is that which would occur were relevant disagreement only on the y-dimension.
Surprisingly, however, areas of the parameter space in which two and only two coalitions are
possible are a proper subset of the areas in which cleavages are binary crosscutting. This is because
values of C exist such that any of the three possible governing coalitions may form in equilibrium:
these values are denoted by the striped regions in Figure 6. In those regions, intermediate values
of ω give rise to a different coalition profile than would occur if politics were restricted to either
the x− or the y− dimension.
The right panel of Figure 6 provides a useful example. Suppose C = (−13 , 53). For low values
of ω, A and C coalesce against B; whereas for high values, B and C coalesce against A. For
intermediate values of ω, A and B coalesce against C.
3.4.2 Estrangement and Crosscuttingness in the Bundled Policy Environment
CHAIN RULE ARGUMENT
We now turn to our analysis of the relationship between crosscuttingness and political estrange-
ment. We begin by considering the effect of vertical or horizontal changes in the location of C.
Because our measures of crosscuttingness, Qb or Qr, are discrete, we are interested in changes in
C that would yield discrete changes in either or both of those measures. If the change in C that
produces an increase in crosscuttingness also produces a decrease in maximal estrangement, this
would be consistent with the canonical intuition. However, a finding that a change in C produced
an increase in both crosscuttingness and maximal estrangement would be inconsistent with the
canonical intuition.
The following lemma establishes conditions under which a horizontal or vertical change in C
increases or decreases maximal estrangement.
Lemma 1. An increase in xC (yC) yields an increase in maximal estrangement if and only if
1. the governing coalition is AB and xC >
1
2 (yC >
1
2); or
2. the governing coalition is AC and xC > 2 (yC > 2); or
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3. the governing coalition is BC and xC > −1 (yC > −1).
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, if C is the outlier faction, then a horizontal (vertical) increase in the direction of
the equilibrium policy of (12 ,
1
2) will reduce maximal estrangement, while an increase away from the
equilibrium policy will increase estrangement. By contrast, if either A or B is the outlier faction,
than holding the governing coalition fixed, a change in C moves the equilibrium policy closer to or
farther away from the outlier, leading to a corresponding decrease or increase in the estrangement
of that faction.
Our next result relates the discrete changes in crosscuttingness (binary and rank) brought about
by vertical or horizontal changes in C to changes in maximal estrangement brought about by the
same change in C.
Proposition 2. Under bundled policy-making, if C is the outlier faction then a horizontal or ver-
tical change in C that increases either binary or rank crosscuttingness strictly decreases maximal
estrangement. If A or B is the outlier faction, then a horizontal or vertical change in C that
increases either binary or rank crosscuttingness can either increase or decrease maximal estrange-
ment.
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand the logic behind the first part of the result, suppose that yC is sufficiently
high that C is the outlier faction for any value of xC . From the definitions of binary and rank-
crosscuttingness above, increases in xC weakly increase both kinds of crosscuttingness for xC < 1/2
– precisely the region in which maximal estrangement is decreasing in xC . Likewise, increases in
xC weakly decrease both kinds of crosscuttingness for xc > 1/2 – when maximal estrangement is
increasing in xC . An analogous intuition holds for horizontal changes in xC when yC < −1, and
for vertical changes in yC when xC < −1 and xC > 2.
As noted above, however, matters change when A or B is the outlier faction, because a change
in C brings about a change in the equilibrium policy. Depending on the initial location of C, such
a change can either increase or decrease maximal estrangement. For example, suppose that ω = 12
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and C = (2−ε, 112). Here, A is the outlier faction. An increase in xC to 2+ε increases both binary
and rank crosscuttingness. It also pulls the equilibrium policy to the right, thereby increasing A’s
estrangement. By contrast, suppose C = (12 + ε, 1). A decrease in xC to
1
2 − ε increases both kinds
of crosscuttingness while decreasing estrangement.
Our interpretation of this result is two-fold. First, it underscores the point made by our moti-
vating example – that the relationship between crosscutting cleavages and polities’ welfare is not
as straightforward as we may have been accustomed to thinking. Second, we interpret this result
as a kind of baseline relative to which we may seek to refine the analysis of the effects of cross-
cutting cleavages. In particular, the ambiguity of the result highlights an important fact about
the relationship between crosscuttingness and estrangement: namely, that change in the preference
profile that brings about a change in the former can also bring about change in the latter via two
mechanisms.
The first mechanism is associated with change in the relative distances between factions. It is
these relative changes that underlie our construction of both the binary and rank crosscuttingness
indices. The second mechanism is associated with changes in absolute distances. In other words,
a vertical or horizontal shift in C does not generically hold mean latent disagreement fixed. In
the examples offered above, the contemplated shifts that resulted in decreases in estrangement also
simultaneously decreased mean latent disagreement.
To be sure, in the standard economic comparative statics analysis, ceteris paribus clauses hold
fixed changes that are not consequences of the change in the variable that is the focus of comparative
statics. In contrast, here, the changes in D¯ω are a direct consequence of a change in C that alters
relative crosscuttingness.
Nonetheless, we wish to rule out the possibility that the relationships documented in Proposition
2 arise as artifacts of changes in the polity’s latent degree of conflict. To do so, we next consider
changes in xC along level curves of mean latent disagreement, and, in so doing, get a stronger result
on the direct effect of crosscuttingness. In other words, we examine counterfactual changes in the
preference profile that vary the extent of crosscuttingness while holding mean latent disagreement
fixed.
19
The following lemma articulates how changes in the location of C along a level curve of mean
latent disagreement affect the degree of maximal estrangement.
Lemma 2. Under bundled policy-making, a change in C that decreases the distance between C
and the axis of symmetry while holding mean latent disagreement fixed strictly decreases maximal
estangement.
Proof. See Appendix.
When C is the outlier faction, the posited change moves C closer to the equilibrium policy of
(12 ,
1
2). Otherwise, the posited change moves the equilibrium policy closer to the outlier faction.
With this Lemma in hand, we are now in a position to relate changes in crosscuttingness to
changes in maximal estrangement, holding mean latent disagreement fixed.
Proposition 3. Under bundled policy-making, holding constant mean latent disagreement, (a) if
mean latent disagreement is sufficiently low, a change in C that increases binary crosscuttingness
strictly decreases maximal estrangement; (b) if mean latent disagreement is sufficiently high, a
change in C that increases binary or rank crosscuttingness can either increase or decrease maximal
estrangement.
WHY IS THERE AN ASYMMETRY BETWEEN (a) AND (b) PARTS?
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand part (a) of the result, concerning binary crosscuttingness, note that for low
values of mean latent disagreement, a move in the direction of the axis of symmetry, which from
Lemma 2 produces a decrease in maximal estrangement, also corresponds to an increase in binary
crosscuttingness – for example, a shift from the white region containing B in the left panel of
Figure 3 to the gray region to either of the adjacent gray regions. By contrast, suppose mean latent
disagreement is high, and C = (−1 + ε, 212). A change in C toward the axis of symmetry holding
mean latent disagreement fixed to C ′ = (−1 − ε, 212 − δ), would simultaneously decrease binary
crosscuttingness while decreasing estrangement.
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Part (b) of the result emerges because changes in C along a MLD curve in the direction of the
axis of symmetry yield generically non-monotonic changes in rank crosscuttingness. For example,
suppose mean latent disagreement is high. Then a change in C toward the axis of symmetry can
produce a transition from Qr = 2 to Qr = 3 to Qr = 2 to Qr = 1, as is evident from the right panel
of Figure 3 for yC > 2 and xC < 1. In this sense, the result in part (b) parallels part (a). However,
when considering rank crosscuttingness, the ambiguity persists when mean latent disagreement is
low. For example, a change in C toward the axis of symmetry along a low D
ω
level curve in the
neighborhood of B can transition from Qr = 1 to Qr = 2 and back to Qr = 1, while C on an even
still lower level curve can pass through Qr = 1 to Qr = 0 and back to Qr = 1.
Interestingly, for at least some values of ω, the canonical intuition concerning the negative
relationship between crosscuttingness and estrangement holds for a band of different values of
mean latent disagreement. The following corollary provides a result for the special case of ω = 12 .
Corollary 1. Suppose ω = 12 . Then a change in C that holds constant mean latent disagreement
and that increases rank crosscuttingness strictly decreases maximal estrangement if and only if
D
ω ∈ (1, 43).
3.4.3 Estrangement, Realignment, and Political Salience
Our next set of results concerns the effect of changes in the relative salience of the two policy
dimensions. Note that in our model, the fact that cleavages are or are not crosscutting does not
have uniformly remedial effects on estrangement except in unusual circumstances. Note, however,
that this may be a consequence of the fact that when governance is conducted in a bundled policy
making system, one faction is invariably excluded. If the political rationale for crosscutting cleavages
is that they create the potential for all factions to participate in the political process (i.e., through a
system of power-sharing), bundled policy-making does not permit this. In the bundled environment,
the more relevant notion of power-sharing is intertemporal: a faction may be out of power today,
but is just one shock away from being brought to power tomorrow. In this sense, the channel
through which crosscuttingness manifests its relevant effect on estrangement is through increases
in the susceptibility of the political system to realignment.
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In our model, the relative salience of policy dimensions does not have an effect on crosscut-
tingness. However, changes in salience can affect the likelihood of realignment (e.g., Burnham
1975; Sundquist 1983). Perhaps susceptibility to realignment, by increasing the stake of an outlier
faction, reduces estrangement and (ultimately) improves political stability.
Suppose C is located in an area of C-space in which cleavages are binary crosscutting, so
realignment is feasible. A change in salience could, in principle, bring about one or (via Remark 1)
two realignments. Let ω∗(C) represent a critical value of ω that yields a transition from one coalition
profile to another. (Because values of C exist that give rise to three possible governing coalitions
depending on ω, ω∗(C) need not be unique.) Changes in ω in the direction of ω∗ represent increases
in the susceptibility of the political system to realignment; when ω = ω∗, that susceptibility is at
its maximum. Of course, an increase in susceptibility can occur given a decrease in ω given ω > ω∗,
or an increase in ω given ω < ω∗.
This yields three possibilities: it could be that estrangement is locally minimized at ω∗, which
would be indicated by ∂Sˆ∂ω |ω < ω∗ < 0 and ∂Sˆ∂ω |ω > ω∗ > 0; that disaffection is locally maximized
at ω∗ (∂Sˆ∂ω |ω < ω∗ > 0 and ∂Sˆ∂ω |ω > ω∗ < 0; or that increasing susceptibility depends on the status
quo alignment: e.g., given the possibility of realignment from AB to AC, increasing susceptibility
to realignment increases estrangement if the current coalition is AB, but decreases it if the current
coalition is AC. We have the following result:
Proposition 4. A change in ω that increases the susceptibility of a political system to realignment
can lead to an increase or decrease in maximal estrangement. However, maximal estrangement is
never locally maximized at the point of transition.
Proof. See Appendix.
As the proposition indicates, it is never the case that changing the relative salience of dimen-
sions in such a way as to increase the political system’s susceptibility to realignment can increase
estrangement irrespective of the status quo alignment. That said, the relationship between suscep-
tibility to realignment and maximal estrangement is frequently ambiguous. In particular, values of
C exist for which the effect of an increase in susceptibility is contingent on the status quo. The
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Figure 7: The Relationship Between Susceptibility to Realignment and Maximal Estrangement
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Pale gray regions in the figure correspond to values of C for which an increase in susceptibility to
realignment can either increase or decrease estrangement, depending on the status quo alignment.
Darker gray regions correspond to values of C for which maximal susceptibility to realignment is
associated with local estrangement minima. For values of C in the striped regions, two realignments
are possible: maximal susceptibility to one gives rise to a local estrangement minimum, while an
increase in susceptibility to the other can either increase or decrease estrangement depending on
the status quo alignment.
pale gray regions in Figure 7 correspond to such cases.
In the dark gray regions of the figure, one realignment is possible, and maximal estrangement is
locally minimized when the system is maximally susceptible to realignment. As noted in Remark
6, in the striped regions, two realignments are possible. Increases in the susceptibility of the system
to one of those realignments can either increase or decrease maximal estrangement depending on
the current alignment. And maximal susceptibility to the other locally minimizes estrangement.
Thus, to the extent that susceptibility to realignment can be interpreted as the potential for
power-sharing, the intuition that increasing that susceptibility invariably lowers estrangement is
partially confirmed and partially disconfirmed. In particular, the validity of the intuition is contin-
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gent on the profile of ideal points and/or the current alignment. In some cases, maximal suscep-
tibility to realignment does indeed locally minimize estrangement. For others, however, increasing
susceptibility can increase or decrease estrangement, depending on the status quo governing coali-
tion.
3.5 Crosscutting Cleavages with Unbundled Policy Making
A number of scholars have suggested that highly divided societies might decentralize policy making
authority to protect the polity against the centrifugal forces of factional conflict. With this in
mind, we next consider a model in which the dimensions of political conflict are unbundled, in the
sense that conflict on one dimension does not affect conflict on the other. As above, factions do
not vote directly on policy; rather, their choices are simply which other faction(s) to join with on
a particular policy dimension in order to form a majority coalition that then sets policy.4
Again, we do not model intra-coalitional bargaining explicitly. Instead factions choose which
other factions to coalesce with on each dimension, with the majority coalition on a dimension (which
may consist of either two or three factions) setting policy at the mean of its factions’ coordinates
on that dimension.
As above, the coalition that sets policy on each dimension will be minimum winning – that is,
it will consist of two factions. This is because in a “grand” coalition of all three factions, two of
the three factions could always be made better off by excluding the third.
With this in mind, denote by (IJ)x an outcome corresponding to the formation of a governing
coalition between factions I and J on the x dimension. We will refer to (IJ)x as the x-coalition, and
corresponding (IJ)y, the outcome on the y-dimension, as the y-coalition. The Nash equilibrium
of the game is very straightforward: for two factions to form a coalition on a given dimension,
they must each prefer the policy that would emerge from coalescing with the other to the one that
emerge from coalescing with the third faction. This is equivalent to each coalition member being
closer to the other on the relevant dimension than to the third faction. Thus:
4For purposes of comparison, we explore a variant of unbundled policy making in which policy on each dimension
is determined by majority rule in the Appendix. The primary insight of this exploration is the dependence of
estrangement, defined below, on the allocation of agenda-control rights and the location of the status quo.
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Proposition 5. In equilibrium, z-coalition profiles and policy pz on the z dimension for z ∈ {x, y}
are, respectively:
(1) (AB)z, pz =
1
2 if and only if |zC | ≥ 1 and |zC − 1| ≥ 1
(2) (AC)z, pz =
zC
2 if and only if |zC | ≤ 1 and |zC | ≤ |zC − 1|
(3) (BC)z, pz =
1+zC
2 if and only if |zC − 1| ≤ 1 and |zC − 1| ≤ |zC |.
Areas of the space of Cs that give rise to different coalition configurations are delineated by the
left panel of Figure 3: in other words, unbundled policy making instantiates binary crosscuttingness.
For example, if C = (0, 1), the coalition profile on the x-dimension would be (AC)x, while the y-
coalition profile would be (BC)y.
Note that the existence of binary crosscutting cleavages is independent of the relative salience of
the two dimensions as represented by ω (cf. Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Lijphart 1977). Moreover,
we have the following remark:
Remark 2. Under unbundled policy making, for a given preference profile ρ, z-coalitions that form
in equilibrium are independent of the value of ω.
Indeed, this remark is a direct consequence of the separability of dimensions, and reflects a
significant departure from the bundled policy making environment. It may be the case, in other
words, that a faction is only included in the coalition setting policy on a relatively unimportant
dimension.
3.5.1 Estrangement Under Unbundled Policy Making
We next consider the relationship between crosscuttingness and maximal estrangement under an
unbundled governance structure. The first result in this section considers the effects of vertical or
horizontal changes in C.
Proposition 6. In the unbundled policy making environment, a horizontal (vertical) change in C
that yields an increase in binary crosscuttingness strictly decreases maximal estrangement.
Proof to be added, along with result holding mean latent disagreement fixed.
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3.6 Institutional Comparisons
Next, we examine how, for a given preference profile and issue salience, institutions affect political
conflict. First, as noted above, a common argument in favor of decentralizing policy making is that
it will reduce the degree of estrangement by giving a stake to groups that would otherwise be left
out of the decision making process. As the next result suggests, however, decentralization is not
necessarily a panacea, even in the presence of crosscutting cleavages.
Proposition 7. If cleavages are not binary crosscutting, then maximal estrangement is the same
under bundled and unbundled policy making. If cleavages are binary crosscutting, and the outlier
faction is the same under both institutions and sufficiently centrist on one dimension and sufficiently
extreme on the other, then maximal estrangement is strictly higher under unbundled than under
bundled policy making. Otherwise, maximal estrangement is strictly higher under bundled than
under unbundled policy making.
Proof. See Appendix
The intuition behind the first part of the proposition is immediate: if cleavages are not cross-
cutting, then the equilibrium policy (and thus the maximally estranged faction) are the same
under bundling and unbundling. To understand the second part of the intuition, imagine that
C = (0.48, 3) is the maximally estranged faction under both institutions, and that ω = 12 . Clearly,
C’s estrangement is generated primarily by its vertical distance from A and B. Now note that
under both bundling and unbundling, A and B will set policy at 12 on the y-dimension. Under
bundled policy making, A and B will set policy at 12 on the x-dimension as well. But under unbun-
dled policy making, A and C will set policy at 0.24. In other words, the policy on the horizontal
dimension that would be arrived at via the multidimensional logroll between A and B is better for
C than the policy it could get were it to join a governing coalition with A on that dimension. In
other words, conditions exist under which an outlier faction would prefer not to govern.
The final result concerns the efficiency of policy making under different institutions:
Proposition 8. Under bundled institutions, equilibrium policy is Pareto efficient. If cleavages are
not binary crosscutting, then equilibrium policy under unbundled institutions is Pareto efficient. If
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cleavages are binary crosscutting, then equilibrium policy under unbundled institutions is Pareto
efficient if and only if the preference profile exhibits maximal rank crosscuttingness.
Proof. See Appendix
Under bundled institutions or unbundled institutions when cleavages are not binary crosscut-
ting, policy lies on the contract curve between two factions and is thus Pareto efficient. Under
unbundled institutions when cleavages are binary crosscutting, conditions can emerge in which the
equilibrium policy falls outside of the triangle formed by the ideal points of factions A, B, and C.
However, when Qr = 3, policies are once again Pareto efficient.
The next remark follows immediately from Proposition 8
Remark 3. Under unbundled policy making, Pareto efficiency is non-monotonic in rank crosscut-
tingness.
4 Discussion and Extensions
Still to do: robustness of results relating crosscuttingness and maximal estrangement using spatial
generalization of Rae and Taylor XC measure.
Add Appendix in which unbundled policy making follows median voter model
5 Conclusion
To come...
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Appendix
We begin with the following preliminary lemmata:
Lemma A 1. The axis of symmetry defined by DωAC = D
ω
BC is yC = −1−ωω xC + 12ω .
Proof. Substituting the expressions for DωAC and D
ω
BC yields
(
(1− ω)x2C + ωy2C
) 1
2 =
(
(1− ω) (xC − 1)2 + ω (yC − 1)2
) 1
2
.
Solving for yC gives the expression in the proposition.
Lemma A 2. Under bundled policy making, the excluded faction is the maximally estranged faction.
Proof. In the triangle formed by the factions’ ideal points, the midpoint of the shortest side is the
equilibrium policy under bundled policy making. Suppose C is the excluded faction. Estrangement
Sˆ is the length of the triangle’s median from C to that point. The distance from either A or B to the
implemented policy is
DωAB
2 . From Appolonius’ theorem, Sˆ =
1
2
√
2Dω2AC + 2D
ω2
BC −Dω2AB.5 Sˆ >
DωAB
2
if and only if Dω2AC +D
ω2
BC > D
ω2
AB. By the law of cosines, D
ω2
AB = D
ω2
AC +D
ω2
BC − 2DωABDωBC cos γ,
where γ is the angle associated with vertex C. Substituting for Dω2AB, the inequality holds if
−2DωABDωBC cos γ < 0. if C is the excluded faction, DωAB is the shortest side of the triangle,
implying γ is acute; therefore cos γ > 0 and the inequality holds. Analogous proofs establish the
results when A or B is the excluded faction.
Lemma A 3. Under unbundled policy making, the maximally estranged faction participates in the
governing coalition on no more than one dimension.
Proof. When cleavages are not binary crosscutting, equilibrium policy is identical under bundling
and unbundling, and one faction participates in the governing coalition on neither dimension; by
Lemma A2, it is also the most estranged. Suppose cleavages are binary crosscutting, and C is
maximally estranged. It is straightforward to demonstrate that either xC < −1 and yC ∈ (−1, 2),
xC > 2 and yC ∈ (−1, 2), yC < −1 and xC ∈ (−1, 2), or yC > 2 and xC ∈ (−1, 2). Given A = (0, 0)
5Establishing that Appolonius’ theorem holds for ω-weighted Euclidean distance is trivial.
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and B = (1, 1), it is immediate that C does not participate in policy making on the x-dimension
in the first two cases and on the y-dimension in the second two. Next, suppose A is maximally
estranged. It is straightforward to demonstrate that this occurs when yC > 1 − xC , yC < 2, and
xC < 2. For these values of C, A never coalesces with B on either dimension. A coalesces with
C on the x-dimension if and only if yC > 1 − xC , yC < 2, and xC < 0, in which case B coalesces
with C on the y-dimension. A coalesces with C on the y-dimension if and only if yC > 1 − xC ,
yC < 0, and xC < 2, in which case B coalesces with X on the x-dimension. The proof when B is
maximally estranged is symmetric to that when A is.
Lemma A 4. (a) Under both bundled and unbundled policy making, if a faction is the dimension-
by-dimension median it cannot be the most estranged faction. (b) Suppose cleavages are binary-
crosscutting. Under unbundled policy making, if the maximally estranged faction is the median on
one dimension and not the other, then the dimension on which the faction participates is the one
on which it is the median.
Proof. (a) Suppose A is the median on both dimensions. Then xC , yC < 0, in which case B or
C is maximally estranged under both bundled and unbundled policy making. Suppose B is the
median on both dimensions. Then xC , yC > 1, in which case A or C is maximally estranged on
both dimensions. Suppose C is the median on both dimensions. Then xC , yC ∈ (0, 1), in which
case A or B is the maximally estranged faction. (b) Suppose C is maximally estranged and median
on x. Then yC > 2 or yC < −1 and xC ∈ (0, 1). Then the x-coalition is ACx or BCx. Suppose A
is maximally estranged and median on x. Then xC ∈ (−1, 0) and the x-coalition is ACx. Suppose
B is maximally estranged and median on x. Then xC ∈ (1, 2) and x-coalition is BCx. The proof is
substantively identical when the estranged faction is the median on y.
Lemma A 5. Estrangement under bundled policy making is everywhere continuous.
Proof. Holding the excluded faction fixed, the expression for S is everywhere continuous. To rule
out discontinuities at realignment frontiers, note that in the triangle formed by the factions’ ideal
points, estrangement is the length of the triangle’s median from the ideal point of the excluded
faction to the midpoint of the opposite side. At any point along a realignment frontier, two factions’
30
ideal points are equidistant from the third and thus the triangle is isosceles. In an isosceles triangle,
the medians extending from the vertices connecting the unequal side are equal in length.
Next, we provide proofs for results in the text.
Proof of Lemma 1. From Proposition 1 and the definition of weighted-Euclidean distance,
Sˆ(AB, bundled) = ((1− ω)(xC − 12)2 + ω(yC − 12)2)
1
2 , Sˆ(AC, bundled) = ((1− ω)(1− xC2 )2 + ω(1−
yC
2 )
2)
1
2 , and Sˆ(BC, bundled) = ((1−ω)(xC+12 )2 +ω(yC+12 )2)
1
2 . Differentiating each with respect to
xC and yC and comparing to zero gives the expressions in the Lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 2. If C is the outlier faction, then for any yC a change in xC produces an
increase (decrease) in both binary and rank crosscuttingness for xC < (>)
1
2 , as well as a decrease
(increase) in maximal estrangement via Lemma 1. Likewise, for any xC a change in yC produces an
increase (decrease) in both binary and rank crosscuttingness for yc < (>)12 , as well as a decrease
(increase) in maximal estrangement. If B is the outlier faction, then for any ω ∈ (0, 1), ∃ a pair
C = (1− ε, yC) that yields governing coalition AC and for which an increase in xC to 1 + ε yields
a decrease in both binary and rank crosscuttingness and a decrease in B’s estrangement. Likewise,
for any ω ∈ (0, 1), ∃ a pair C = (12 − ε, yC) that yields governing coalition AC and for which an
increase in xC to
1
2 + ε yields an increase in both binary and rank crosscuttingness and a decrease
in B’s estrangement. The same logic holds for changes in yC , and in the case where A is the outlier
faction. 
Proof of Lemma 2. There are three cases to consider. First, suppose C is the outlier faction. By
Appolonius’ Theorem, Sˆ = 12
√
2Dω2AC + 2D
ω2
BC − 1. From the definition of D
ω
, DωAC + D
ω
BC = k,
where k = 3d − 1 for Dω = d. Therefore DωAC = k − DωBC , and Dω2AC = k2 − 2kDωBC + Dω2BC .
Substituting into the expression for Sˆ yields Sˆ = 12
√
2k2 − 4kDωBC + 4Dω2BC − 1. Differentiating
with respect to DωBC gives
∂Sˆ
∂DωBC
=
2DωBC−k
Sˆ
, which is strictly negative for DωBC <
k
2 =
3d−1
2 . Recall
d = 13(D
ω
AC + D
ω
BC + 1). Substituting and rearranging yields D
ω
BC < D
ω
AC , which holds for all yC
above the axis of symmetry as defined in Lemma A1. When DωBC < D
ω
AC , an increase in D
ω
BC
corresponds to a move in the direction of the axis of symmetry. When DωBC > D
ω
AC ,
∂Sˆ
∂DωBC
> 0,
and yC falls below the axis of symmetry. In this case, an increase corresponds to a move away from
the axis of symmetry; thus, a move toward that boundary would, again, decrease Sˆ.
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2. Suppose A is the outlier faction. From Proposition 1, this can only occur if DωBC <
DωAC , which implies yC lies above the axis of symmetry. Thus, a move in the direction of the
axis of symmetry holding MLD fixed implies an increase in DωBC . From Appolonius’ theorem,
Sˆ = 12
√
2Dω2AC + 2−Dω2BC . From above, Dω2AC = k2 − 2kDωBC + Dω2BC . Substituting yields Sˆ =
1
2
√
2k2 − 4kDωBC +Dω2BC + 2 Differentiating with respect to DωBC yields ∂Sˆ∂DωBC =
DωBC−2k
2Sˆ
, which
is negative if and only if DωBC < 2k. Substituting for k = 3d − 1 and d = 13(DωAC + DωBC + 1),
this simplifies to DωBC > −2DωAC , which always holds. An increase in DωBC corresponds to a move
toward the axis of symmetry given yC lies above the axis, which, as noted above, must be the case
when A is the outlier faction.
3. Suppose B is the outlier faction. From Proposition 1, this can only occur if DωBC >
DωAC , which implies yC falls below the axis of symmetry. From Appolonius’ Theorem, Sˆ =
1
2
√
2 + 2Dω2BC −Dω2AC . Substituting for Dω2AC as above yields Sˆ = 12
√
2 +Dω2BC − k2 + 2kDωBC . Dif-
ferentiating with respect to DωBC yields
∂Sˆ
∂DωBC
=
DωBC+k
2Sˆ
, which is strictly positive. For yC below
the axis of symmetry, the increase in DωBC that would increase Sˆ corresponds to a move away from
the axis of symmetry. Therefore a move toward the boundary would correspondingly decrease Sˆ.
Proof of Proposition 3. Proof relies on Lemma 2 plus the superimposition of mean latent
disagreement curves on the binary and rank crosscuttingness figures. 
Proof of Proposition 4. When cleavages are not binary crosscutting, the political system is not
susceptible to realignment. When cleavages are crosscutting, there are two possibilities: either the
preference profile gives rise to one realignment, or it gives rise to two. In regions of C-space for
which one is possible, it is sufficient, for a given value of C, to compare the signs of the derivative
under the governing coalition that would form on the x-dimension with that which would form
on the y-dimension, in the manner specified in the text. In regions of C-space for which two
realignments are possible, the governing coalition that would form for intermediate levels of ω is
that which would not form if policy were restricted to the x- or y- dimension. In these cases, it
is sufficient to compare the signs associated with the transition from the governing coalition that
would form on the x-dimension to that which would form on neither the x- nor y-dimensions, and
the latter with the coalition that would form on the y-dimension. Differentiating the expression for
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Sˆ with respect to ω, if AB is the governing coalition then ∂Sˆ∂ω is positive if and only if (yC > xC
and yC > 1 − xC) or (yC < xC and yC < 1 − xC); if AC is the governing coalition if and only if
(yC > xC and yC > 4 − xC) or (yC < xC and yC < 4 − xC); and if BC is the governing coalition
if and only if (yC > xC and yC > −2 − xC) or (yC < xC and yC < −2 − xC). These conditions
permit one to (mechanically) identity the possible patterns described in the text. 
Proof of Proposition 7. When cleavages are binary-crosscutting, there are two cases to consider.
In the first, the maximally estranged faction under bundled and that under unbundled policy making
differ. Suppose the maximally estranged faction under unbundled policy making was excluded under
bundled policy making and that the remaining factions set policy. Call the resultant estrangement
of that faction S˜. In any triangle, the median to its shortest side is its longest median. Thus
S˜ < Sˆ(bundled). If cleavages are binary-crosscutting, then the maximally estranged faction under
unbundled policy making participates in the coalition setting policy on one dimension. Thus,
policy on that dimension must be closer to her ideal point then under the scenario that generates
estrangement S˜, while policy on the other dimension is unchanged. Therefore Sˆ(unbundled) < S˜,
implying Sˆ(unbundled) < Sˆ(bundled).
In the second case, the maximally estranged faction is the same under bundled and unbundled
policy making. Suppose that faction is the median on neither dimension. By Lemma A3, that
faction participates in policy making on one dimension; thus, policy on that dimension is closer
than it would be under bundled policy making, in which case the other two factions would set
policy on that dimension. On the remaining dimension policy is the same under both institutions;
therefore Sˆ(unbundled) < Sˆ(bundled).
Next, suppose the maximally estranged faction is the median on one dimension but not the
other. By part (b) of Lemma A4, under unbundled policy making, the faction participates in
the dimension on which it is the median. This implies that policy on the other dimension is
the same across bundled and unbundled institutions. Suppose, without loss of generality, the
dimension on which it is the median is x, and for factions i, j, and k, that xi < xj < xk. Then
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S(unbundled) < S(bundled) if and only if
min
{∣∣∣∣xj − xj + xi2
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣xj − xj + xk2
∣∣∣∣} < ∣∣∣∣xj − xi + xk2
∣∣∣∣
This inequality holds if and only if xj is sufficiently far from the midpoint of xi and xk.
If the most estranged faction is the median on both dimensions, it cannot be the most estranged
faction by part (a) of Lemma A4.
If cleavages are not binary-crosscutting, then policy (and hence the most disaffected faction) is
the same, and so estrangement is the same under bundled and unbundled policy making. 
Proof of Proposition 8. To establish the policy’s Pareto efficiency it is necessary and sufficient
to demonstrate that the equilibrium policy lies in the open interior of the triangle formed by A,
B, and C’s ideal points. If cleavages are not binary crosscutting, then the equilibrium policy lies
on the contract curve between two factions, and is therefore efficient. Suppose cleavages are binary
crosscutting. The column vectors B = (1, 1) and C = (xC , yC) form a basis for R2. Therefore, the
policy vector P = (xP , yP ) can be expressed as the linear combination P = αB + βC. Solving for
α and β yield α = yCxP−yP xCyC−xC and β =
yP−xP
yC−xC . The necessary and sufficient conditions for P to lie
in the open interior of the triangle formed by A, B, and C are α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, and α+ β ≤ 1.
Suppose (AB)x < (AC)x < (BC)x. Then xP =
1
2 and xC < −1. Given the ordering, yC < xC
only if cleavages are not binary crosscutting, which violates the above supposition. Therefore
yC > xC . Binary crosscutting cleavages implies that (AB)y cannot be the shortest y-distance
between factions. Suppose (AC)y is the shortest y-distance. Then yP =
yC
2 . Substituting the
expressions for xP and yP into the condition β ≥ 0 and simplifying yields yC ≥ 1. But (AC)y is the
shortest y-distance if and only if yC ∈ (−1, 12), a contradiction. Therefore P is not Pareto efficient.
Next, suppose (BC)y is the shortest y-distance, so yP =
yC+1
2 and yC ∈ (12 , 1). Substituting
into the condition α > 0 yields yC ≥ (yC + 1)xC , which holds given the conditions on yC and
xC . Substituting into the condition β > 0 and simplifying yields yC > 0, which holds given the
condition on yC . Substituting into the condition α + β ≤ 1 and simplifying yields yC ≤ 1, which
holds only for (BC)y < (AC)y < (AB)y, for which Q
r = 3.
A similar logic establishes the result for (AB)x < (BC)x < (AC)x, (AC)x < (AB)x < (BC)x,
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(AC)x < (BC)x < (AB)x, (BC)x < (AB)x < (AC)x, and (BC)x < (AC)x < (AB)x.
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